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The World Court Decision in the Canada-United States Gulf of
Maine Seaward Boundary Dispute: A Perspective From
Historical Geography
by Louis De Vorsey*
and
Megan C. De Vorsey**
I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 12, 1984, a five-member Chamber of the International
Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case concerning the delimitation of the United States-Canadian maritime boundary in the Gulf
of Maine and seaward over the rich fishing grounds known as Georges
Bank.' The parties brought their dispute for arbitration under the terms
of a Special Agreement, which requested the Chamber to decide, "in accordance with the principles and rules of international law applicable
. . .the following question:"
What is the course of the single maritime boundary that divides the
continental shelf and fisheries zones of Canada and the United States
of America from a point in latitude 44* 11' 12" N, longitude 67* 16'

46" W to a point to be determined by the Chamber within an area
bounded by straight lines connecting the following sets of geographic
co-ordinates:
latitude 40* N, longitude 67* W;
latitude 40* N, longitude 65* W; 2
latitude 42* N, longitude 65* W?
* Professor of Geography, University of Georgia; Montclair State College; M.A., Indiana Uni-

versity; Ph.D., University of London.
** B.A., University of Georgia; J.D., University of Georgia Law School.
I Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
246 (Judgment of Oct. 12) [hereinafter cited as Delimitation]. The Chamber was not unanimous in
its decision. Judge Schwebel voted for the Chamber's judgment and found the resulting line of
delimitation to be equitable but not correctly adjusted to account for the Bay of Fundy's legal status.
Judge Gros, on the other hand, dissented from the Chamber's judgment.
2 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 263-64, citing Special Agreement, art. II, para. 1 (Order of Jan.
20, 1982). Point A was simply the first point of intersection of the two lines representing the limits
of the U.S. and Canada fishing zones claimed at the time they extended their jurisdictions to 200
nautical miles. There is a lingering dispute concerning which country has sovereignty over Machias
Seal Island and North Rock that made it expedient to select point A rather than the terminus of the
international boundary as a beginning for the seaward delimitation line. The triangular area that
was to contain the delimitation line termination was similarly established as a result of the claims of
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The general area of this lateral seaward boundary with the beginning point designated "A," and the large triangular area, thus described,
is shown in Figure 1. Briefly stated, the Chamber was charged with determining a line from point A, shown on the map, to some point within
the large triangular area described by the three geographic coordinates
stipulated in the Special Agreement.
As long ago as 1975, discussions concerning the delimitation of a
continental shelf boundary were held between the United States and Canada, but no agreement could be reached.' In 1977, the implementation of
200-mile fishery zones by both countries created pressure for a speedy
resolution of the problem as both the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank
fishing grounds were affected.
In September, 1978, an announcement in the Canadian Gazette further expanded Canada's claim in the region.4 The United States responded by asserting that the new Canadian claim had no merit under
international law and would not be recognized. 5 Finally, in 1979, the
Special Agreement, which contained the question quoted, above was
signed and ratified.
II.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CHAMBER ESTABLISHED

Early in 1982, the International Court of Justice ordered a chamber
of five judges constituted to hear the dispute. Four member judges in the
International Court were selected to sit on the Gulf of Maine Chamber:
Andre Gros of France; Hermann Mosler of West Germany; Roberto
Ago of Italy; and Stephen Schwebel of the United States. Maxwell Cohen, former Dean of McGill University, Faculty of Law, was appointed
by Canada to sit on the Chamber as judge ad hoc.6
August 26, 1982 was fixed as the date for the submission of Memorials by both Canada and the United States. The Memorials are massive
printed documents running to six volumes in the case of the United
States and five volumes for the Canadian argument. No expense was
spared in collecting and presenting the evidence to support each side's
contentions. Many of the colored maps and illustrations used would
have looked at home in the Canadian Geographical or National GeographicMagazine, such is their quality.
After six months, during which experts on both sides analyzed each
the parties at the time of their Special Agreement. In this instance the maximum 200 mile claims of
both terminate within the triangular area near the northeast apex and southwest apex respectively.
Id. at 265.
3 Memorial of the United States (Can. v. U.S.) 86 (Memorial dated Sept. 27, 1982).
4 Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.) 107 (Memorial dated Sept. 1982).
5 Memorial of the United States (Can. v. U.S.), at 96.
6 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 252.
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other's arguments and supporting evidence, a second or Counter-Memorial was filed with the World Court. The Counter-Memorials were delivered for exchange on June 28, 1983. As with the Memorials, they are
lavishly illustrated multi-volume printed documents. Needless to say,
the Counter-Memorials were carefully analyzed by the opposing parties.
After several months of hard work, responses to the Counter-Memorials
were prepared. These responses, usually referred to as Reply Briefs or
simply Replies, were submitted on December 12, 1983. In the spring of
1984, the World Court Chamber (composed of the five jurists listed
above) heard oral arguments from the representatives of the United
States and Canada. Because of an interruption occasioned by Nicaragua's case against the United States, the oral arguments could not be
completed as originally planned. The arguments commenced on April 2,
1984 and were finally concluded on May 11, 1984.
III.

THE DISPUTE As ARTICULATED By THE
UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Before turning to the Chamber's decision, it is instructive to gain
some perspective on the general nature and significance of the case as
seen by the parties. In Canada's view:
[T]he range of factors in issue gives this case a unique human immediacy and economic importance. For the first time, the Court is asked to
direct its attention to the full panoply of sovereign rights and jurisdiction that coastal States may now exercise in the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea with respect to the living and non-living
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil and the superjacent waters.
The case thus brings together the promise of the continental shelf and
the known abundance of the fishery: the economic prospects that the
shelf may offer in years to come and the present livelihood of coastal
fishermen and the welfare of the communities they sustain.7
In his opening oral presentation outlining the United States point of
view for the Chamber, Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor, United States
Department of State, stressed that:
In the United States, the intense concern with this case stems largely
from historical American links with Georges Bank. United States fishermen have fished significantly on Georges Bank since the 1820s. A
7 Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.), at 18. An important section of Canada's Memorial was
devoted to The Economic Importance of Georges Bank to Canada. In this section the Canadians

stressed the enormous importance of the fishing industry in the overall economy of Nova Scotia.
With reference to that industry, the Court was told that Georges Bank catches, in 1978, contributed
over one-third of the total in value for the Province as a whole. In the five counties forming southwest Nova Scotia, where the bulk of Canada's catches were landed, the proportion jumped to almost
46 percent of the total. The total dollar value of Georges Bank catch landings in the seventeenth
southwest Nova Scotia fishing ports in 1978 amounted to an impressive $64,218,000. Id. at 75-76.
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rich folklore developed surrounding the exploit and the daring of these
brave New Englanders. For almost a century and a half, it was, with
few isolated exceptions, United States vessels alone that fished the waters over Georges Bank. During this period, especially in New England, the fisheries of Georges Bank were, to use a rather common
American metaphor, considered by many citizens to be as "American
as apple pie." In brief, Georges Bank has been closely connected with
the United States for a long time. As could be expected, Canada's
aspirations regarding the northeast portion of Georges Bank provoked
a strong response, not only in New England, but also in the corridors
of Washington.8
IV.

THE DELIMITATION LINES PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES

In their pleadings both Canada and the United States presented specific lines which connected point A with the area of the large triangle
described in their Special Agreement. These proposed delimitation lines
are shown in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, the one proposed by the United
States quickly earned the sobriquet, "the wedding cake line." Although
not precisely a line composed of points which were equidistant in the
terms of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the Canadian line approaches that quality and came to be referred to as "the equidistant line"
or "Canadian line."9 Both of these proposed delimitation lines are
shown on Figure 1, along with the Chamber's. As can be seen, Canada
gained a large area in the Gulf of Maine to which it had not laid any
claim, but received only about one-half of the area on Georges Bank it
had argued for.
In its Memorial, Canada proposed the application of the principle of
equidistance to be appropriate in arriving at an equitable division of the
disputed area. When it came to applying the equidistance method, however, Canada found Cape Cod and its offlying islands to be an "exceptional protrusion" which, "when superadded to the general protrusion of
the coast of Massachusetts," produced an inequitable effect on the delimitation. 10 To remedy the "disproportionate influence" of Cape Cod on
the equidistance computation, the Canadians chose "an appropriate basepoint on Cape Cod" and thus eliminated the effect of the Cape or Nan8 Verbatim Record for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.) at 7 (I.C.J. Apr. 11, 1984).
9 For a discussion of the equidistant maritime boundary concept, see Hodgson & Cooper, The
Technical Delimitation of a Modern EquidistantBoundary, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 361 (1976).
In its application of the equidistant concept, Canada chose to consider Cape Cod as an "irregularity
of the eastern North American coastline." In effect, Canada ignored Cape Cod's existence in the
choice of coastal basepoints from which a line of equidistance was constructed. The U.S. line, while
appearing complex, is basically a perpendicular to the general direction of the coast adjusted to avoid
splitting fishing banks.
10 Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.), at 183.
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tucket Island. " In Canada's view, the adjusted equidistance method
produced "an equitable solution that takes account of all relevant factors
and meets the test of a reasonable degree of proportionality."1 2
When the World Court Chamber scrutinized the Canadian line it
found something less than equity. The Chamber pointed out that:
The Canadian line

. . .

consists of a line constructed almost entirely

from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. In this instance, this means solely islands,
rocks or low-tide elevations. An exception is however made for the
basepoints selected on the coast of Massachusetts, which have been
transferred from the outer end of the peninsula of Cape Cod and Nantucket Island, much further to the west, to the eastern end of Cape
Cod Canal. 13

Canada's inconsistency in failing to feel any obligation to similarly
displace its eastern basepoint from Seal Island to the mainland coast of
Nova Scotia was critically noted by the Chamber. Seal Island lies some
distance off the coast of Nova Scotia and would have displaced the Canadian delimitation line to the favor of the United States had it been used as
a basepoint.
The United States had proposed various delimitation lines in negotiations during the years preceding the World Court adjudication. The
final position of the line was derived from what the United States maintained was the general direction of the coastline facing Georges Bank and
the disputed waters. On this central idea was based a set of assertions,
which the Chamber summarized as follows:
(a) recognition of the priority to be given, in all respects, to consideration of the general southwest and northeast direction
of the eastern seaboard of the American Continent;
(b)

a distinction.

. .

between "primary coasts" and "secondary

coasts," according as they follow the general direction of the
coast or, on the contrary, deviate from it;
(c) the classification, inter alia, of the Atlantic coast of Nova
Scotia as one of the "primary" coasts and of the coast of
Nova Scotia abutting on the Gulf of Maine - like the coast of
Massachusetts abutting on that Gulf - as "secondary" coasts;
(d) a finding that the coast of Maine abutting on the Gulf follows a direction corresponding to the "general direction"
and is, therefore, a "primary" coast; and that Georges Bank,
situated off and opposite
the coast of Maine, is oriented in
14
the same direction.
Id.
Id.
13 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 287.
14 Id. at 318.
11

12

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L LV

Vol. 18:415

Thus, in the Chamber's view, the United States was arguing the concept of natural prolongation through the extension of its primary coastal
front in the geographical sense, rather than in the geological or geomorphological sense. 5 Avoidance of encroachment and cut-off as well as
proportionality were also served by this methodology. Further adjustment was required to ensure total respect for the ecosystems of Georges
Bank and Browns Bank, thus contributing to the stair step or wedding
cake appearance of the United States delimitation line. As the Chamber
viewed it, the resulting line was a "compromise solution between two
fundamentally different methods: the geometrical method of the perpendicular to the general direction of the coast and the ecological method
• . . of respect for the unity of the distinct ecosystems. . . and distribution on that basis between the two neighboring States."' 6
In the opinion of the Chamber neither of the parties' boundary lines
had merit. "In both cases," the majority of judges agreed "the outcome
of the parties' efforts can be said to have been preconceived assertions
rather than any convincing demonstration of the existence of the rules
that each had hoped to find established by international law." 17 Clearly,
the Chamber viewed the voluminous collections of legal and factual findings submitted by the parties flawed by the "a priori nature" of their
underlying premises and deductions.
The Chamber was further critical of the parties' "false premise,"
which led them to search and employ international law "for, as it were, a
set of rules which [were] not there."' 8 "[C]ustomary international law
....
" the Chamber averred, "comprises a limited set of norms for ensuring the co-existence and vital co-operation of the members of the international community. . . ."'I There does, in the Chamber's opinion,
exist a "set of customary rules whose presence . . . can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a sufficiently extensive and convincing
practice, and not by deduction from preconceived ideas." 2 A body of
detailed rules for such a delimitation is not what the Chamber would
accept as a bona fide product resulting from a search of the extant relevant body of international law.
V. THE CHAMBER'S SEARCH FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Chamber's search for the "fundamental norm of customary in15 Id.
16 Id. at 319.
17 Id. at 298.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 299.
20 Id.
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ternational law governing maritime delimitation" and a just delimitation
line2 ' was based on article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.2 2 In the terms of that article, the Court should consider the following authorities in reaching decisions to those disputes it hears:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b) international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted
as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.23
As had been pointed out, the United States and Canada had entered into
a Special Agreement in 1979, which, for the first time, called on the
Court to delimit not only the continental shelf, but also the exclusive
fishing zone in the superjacent waters above it. As will be seen, that
agreement shaped the Chamber's deliberations in important ways.
As the Chamber began the discussion of its mandate and the ensuing search for the "fundamental norm" of international law that should
apply in delineating a boundary, it reminded the parties, "that 'legal title'
to certain maritime or submarine areas is always and exclusively the effect of a legal operation."'24 It was not correct, in the Chamber's opinion,
to conclude that boundaries arose from any sort of intrinsic merit or
physical characteristic. Rather, a boundary was nothing more or less
than the limit of the extent of the title as derived from law. It would not
be correct to conclude "that international law recognized[d] the title conferred on the State by the adjacency of that shelf or that zone, as if the
mere natural fact of adjacency produced legal consequences. ' 25

VI.

EQUITABLE CRITERIA AND PRACTICAL METHODS
FOR A DELIMITATION

It was the Chamber's conclusion that the fundamental norm of international law governing maritime delimitation demanded that such delimitations "be based on the application of equitable criteria and the use
of practical methods capable of ensuring an equitable result."2 6 "In reality," the Chamber stated,
21 Id. at 300.

22 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993.
23 Id. art. 38, para. 1(a)-(d), at 1060, T.S. No. 993.
24 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 295-96.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 300.
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a delimitation by a single line . . . i.e., a delimitation which has to

apply at one and the same time to the continental shelf and to the
superjacent water column can only be carried out by the application of
a criterion, or combination of criteria, which does not give preferential
treatment to one

. . .

to the detriment of the other, and at the same

27
time is such as to be equally suitable to the division of either of them.

The criteria that the Chamber ultimately chose were derived from
geography. By geography the Chamber meant "mainly the geography of
coasts, which has primarily a physical aspect, to which may be added, in
the second place, a political aspect. ' '2 8 Within such a framework, the
Chamber favored "a criterion long held to be as equitable as it is simple,
namely that in principle . . . one should aim at the equal division of

areas where the maritime projections of the coasts of the States. . . converge and overlap." 2 9 The geographical complexities of the New England-Nova Scotia facade fronting the Gulf of Maine would of course
make necessary
the likewise auxiliary criterion whereby it is held equitable partially to
correct any effect of applying the basic criterion that would result in
cutting off one coastline, or part of it, from its appropriate projection
across the maritime expanses to be divided, or then again the criterion
-

it too being of an auxiliary nature -

involving the necessity of

granting some effect, however limited, to the presence of a geographical feature such as an island or group of small islands lying off a coast,
when strict application of the basic criterion
might entail giving them
30
full effect or, alternatively, no effect.
Once committed to this line of reasoning the Chamber found, not
surprisingly, that geometrical methods would be suitable instruments for
giving effect to their criteria for delimitation. In the words of its decision, "[t]he delimitation line to be drawn in a given area will depend
upon the coastal configuration."'" Considered as a whole, the Chamber's
approach to the problem of deciding a single delimitation line for the
continental shelf and waters above it could be said to subscribe to the
adage "the land dominates the sea.", 32 Whether this approach was wise
27

Id. at 327.

28
29

Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
Id. at 330.

30

31

32 Id. at 338. It is significant to note that the Chamber called attention to this adage in its
discussion of the crucial third and longest segment of the delimitation line. This was the segment
that extended seaward from the Gulf of Maine to divide Georges Bank between Canada and the
United States. The "land dominates sea" concept was articulated in several earlier international
disputes concerning coastal jurisdiction. For example, in its Memorial, the United States cited the
Grisbadarna dispute between Norway and Sweden where the Court was quoted as stating:
"Whereas, this opinion is in conformity with the fundamental principles of the law of nations. . . in
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or appropriate will be evaluated below. Before turning to that discussion, however, attention should be given to the manner in which the
Chamber constructed the delimitation line now in effect between Canada
and the United States. Moving from the "fundamental norm" of international law to a practical and equitable boundary line separating the jurisdictions of sovereign states is no easy task.
VII.

CHAMBER'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE DELIMITATION LINE

To begin the construction of a delimitation line the Chamber established what it considered to be the coastal areas of the United States and
Canada fronting on the Gulf of Maine. In discussing this, the Chamber
noted that the parties had frequently involved coasts well outside of the
gulf proper and invoked a broader geographical concept under the rubric
"Gulf of Maine area" in structuring their respective arguments. In the
Chamber's view "the involvement of coasts other than those directly surrounding the Gulf does not and may not have the effect of extending the
delimitation
area to maritime areas which have in fact nothing to do with
33
it."

The Chamber's independent analysis and conclusion that the Gulf
of Maine formed "a broad oceanic indentation in the eastern coast of the
North American Continent, having roughly the shape of an elongated
rectangle," was crucial to the delimitation lines decreed. 34 In the Chamber's construct neither the waters of the Bay of Fundy nor those of Massachusetts Bay and Cape Cod Bay were included in the Gulf of Maine.
The rectangular geometry of the Gulf of Maine
as defined by the Cham3
ber can be observed on the map in Figure 2.1
Beginning at the terminus of the U.S.-Canada international boundaccordance with which the maritime territory is an essential appurtenance of land territory ...."
Memorial of the United States (Can. v. U.S.), at 108. In the Norwegian Fisheries Case, the Court
was guided by the "basic consideration" that "[it] is the land which confers upon the coastal State a
right to the waters off its coast." Norwegian Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 133
(Judgment of Dec. 18). In its Memorial, Canada too drew attention to the principle by quoting the
Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, to wit: "The geographic correlation between coast
and submerged areas off its coast is the basis of the coastal State's legal title. As the Court explained
• . .the continental shelf is a legal concept in which the principle is applied that the land dominates
the sea." North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (W. Ger. v. Neth. & Den.) 1969 I.C.J. 51 cited in
Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.), at 129.
33 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 272.
34 Id. at 268. It is somewhat ironic, in view of the case's outcome, to find that the United
States maintained that the Gulf of Maine Basin was "a large rectangular depression." Memorial of
the United States (Can. v. U.S.), at 24. Canada, apparently by including the Bay of Fundy with the
Gulf of Maine proper, proposed that the gulf was "a great anvil-shaped indentation of the coast."
Memorial of Canada (Can. v. U.S.), at 21.
35 Figure 2 and the following paragraph are based on an interpretation of the Chamber's verbal
report. The maps accompanying the decision do not illustrate these constructs.
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ary, the Chamber found that a straight imaginary line drawn through
Grand Manan Island to Brier Island and Cape Sable would form the
northeastern side of a rectangle. A bit over two hundred miles to the
southwest a similar imaginary line drawn between "the elbow of Cape
Cod" and Cape Ann was found to be the opposite and "quasi-parallel"
side of the rectangle. The long sides were formed by the seaward closing
line between Nantucket Island and Cape Sable and another imaginary
line connecting Cape Elizabeth, Maine, and the Grand Manan Channel.
This rough rectangle then became the framework within which the
Chamber employed its criteria and methods to determine an equitable
line of delimitation through the area of overlapping Canadian and United
States offshore claims.
Point A was not technically an equidistant point but had been designated by the parties as the point of origin for the delimitation line. For
this reason the Chamber found it "necessary to renounce the idea of employing the technical method of equidistance." 3 6 The Chamber chose
instead a method which was "geometrical" and "based on respect for the
geographical situation of the coasts between which the delimitation is to
be effected." 37
In brief, the Chamber drew two lines from point A to form
perpendiculars with the two basic coastal rectangle lines which formed a
corner at the terminus of the international boundary. The reflex angle
that the two perpendiculars formed at point A was found to be approximately 278 degrees. The bisector of this angle was taken as the course or
azimuth for the first segment of the delimitation line. The Chamber had
thus fixed the direction of the first of two segments of the delimitation
line drawn in the Gulf of Maine, which started at point A and ended at
point B where the second segment began. At no point in its discussion of
this, and following crucial delimitation line determinations, did the
Chamber reference or cite earlier actions of the International Court or
other international tribunals. That this was the case is not entirely surprising as tribunals had not usually been requested actually to draw delimitation lines, but rather to indicate the principles and rules of
international law applicable to such delimitations. It should also be kept
in mind that the Chamber was breaking new legal ground in this case in
that, for the first time, a tribunal was requested to draw a single boundary line applicable to all aspects of coastal state jurisdiction including
both the continental shelf and exclusive fishing zone.
To determine the course of the second segment, the Chamber looked
36 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 330. Point A was selected because it was the first point of
intersection of the two lines representing the limits of the fishing zones claimed by Canada and the
United States when they decided to extend their respective fishing jurisdiction zones out to 200
miles. The geographic position of point A is latitude 44* 11' N, longitude 67* 16' 46" W.
37 Id. at 333.
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again at its geometrical rendering of the Gulf of Maine and noted that a
distinctly different relationship existed between the coasts of Nova Scotia
and Massachusetts than that existing between the Canadian province and
Maine. Massachusetts and Nova Scotia formed opposite coasts and did
not have the quality of lateral adjacency that had guided the determination of the first segment of the line from point A. Here, within the Gulf
of Maine, the Chamber stated that only a median line drawn "approximately parallel to the approximately parallel lines of the two opposite
coasts" would satisfy its self-imposed requirement of a method of geometrical origin."8 In essence, the Chamber followed the more general
requirement of article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1958 Convention of the Continental Shelf, which calls for a median line boundary "every point of
which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured."3 9 In this
case, the Chamber's approximately parallel lines forming the northeast
and southwest sides of its Gulf of Maine rectangle were treated as
baselines.
A correction was needed, however, to take account of the difference
in the lengths of the U.S. and Canadian coastlines and achieve equity
through proportionality. In the Chamber's reckoning there were about
284 miles of U.S. coastline as compared to 206 miles of Canadian coastline involved. This produced the ratio of 1.38 to 1. A further correction
was deemed necessary, however, before an equitable adjusted median line
could be fixed upon.
The Chamber considered that Seal Island and Mud Island off the
coast of Nova Scotia should have some influence in the calculation of the
location of the second segment of the delimitation line. Rather than
transfer the whole of the Nova Scotia coastline by the distance between
Seal Island and the mainland, the Chamber decided to allow the island
half effect. This resulted in a corrected ratio of 1.32 to 1 in place of the
1.38 to 1 that was determined before Seal Island was taken into account.
In the Chamber's words, "the result of the effect to be given to the island
is a small transverse displacement of [the corrected median] line, not40 an
angular displacement; and its practical impact therefore is limited."
Thus, the second segment of the delimitation line was the corrected
median line between the coasts of Nova Scotia and that of Massachusetts
as the Chamber had defined them. It intersected the first segment at
point B on the map in Figure 2 and extended seaward to the closing line
of the Gulf of Maine. The Chamber noted
Id. at 334.
Convention on the Continental Shelf, openedfor signatureApr. 29, 1958, art. VI, para. 1, 15
U.S.T. 471, 474, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 316.
40 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 337.
38

39
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that the meeting-point of the first and second segments of the delimitation line, i.e., the pivotal point where this line changes direction, is
located about as far into the Gulf as Chebogue Point, a feature of the
Nova Scotian coast which marks the transition from the part of this
coast in an adjacency relationship with the coast of Maine to the part
facing the Massachusetts coast in a relationship of oppositeness.'
The third and longest segment of the delimitation line would lie entirely seaward of the Gulf of Maine closing line. As a consequence of
this fact, the Chamber reasoned that the most appropriate geometrical
method for its determination would be the simple drawing of a perpendicular from the closing line at the point of intersection with the corrected median line.4 2 This point is shown as C on the accompanying
map. From point C the Chamber's line of delimitation was extended
across Georges Bank into the triangular termination area the parties had
designated in their Special Agreement (Figure 1). There the line of delimitation was terminated where the perpendicular from the Gulf of
Maine closing line reached the outermost extent of the disputed overlapping 200 mile claims of Canada and the United States.4 3
VIII.

THE CHAMBER'S LINE AND SUBJECTIVE PERSPECTIVE

While it is probably incorrect to view the Chamber's efforts in terms
of winning or losing, it is a fact that its line of delimitation confirmed to
Canada a large portion of Georges Bank. In the words of the Chamber's
decision, "[t]his Bank is the real subject of the dispute. . . the principal
stake in the proceedings, from the viewpoint of the potential resources of
the subsoil and also, in particular, that of fisheries that are of major economic importance."' Clearly the coastal geography/geometry methodology followed by the Chamber in its effort to articulate and implement
the fundamental norm of customary international law governing maritime delimitation, had resulted in a division of Georges Bank not radically different from the "equidistance" division that had been argued by
Canada.
In his separate opinion, the American member of the Chamber,
Judge Schwebel, agreed with "the essentials of. . .analysis and reasoning" and found that the "resultant line of delimitation [was] not inequitable."4 5 He did, however, disagree with the placement of the delimitation
line.4 6 In his comments, Judge Schwebel noted that "the law is more
41

Id.

42

Id. at 337-38.
Id. at 339.

43

44 Id.
45 Id. at 353.
46 Id. at 357. Judge Schwebel maintained that the Chamber had not necessarily erred by including the coasts of the Bay of Fundy in its calculations designed to establish a measure of propor-
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plastic than formed" in such matters.47 He also used the term "subjective perspective," a term that, it could be argued, sums up a basic flaw in
the Chamber's whole attempt to move from the fundamental norm of
international law to the practical task of fixing a single line of delimitation through the Gulf of Maine and across Georges Bank.
It will be recalled that the Chamber was critical of the imprecise
definition of the term "Gulf of Maine area" as it was employed by the
parties in their Special Agreement and pleadings. The Chamber considered it "indispensable to achieve a greater degree of precision to the geographical concepts used in this context by way of basis for the operation
which it has to perform."4 To satisfy this need for greater precision, the
Chamber alluded to the maps included with their decision and stated
that "the Gulf of Maine. . . is a broad oceanic indentation in the eastern
coast of the North American Continent, having roughly the shape of an
elongated rectangle."49 To echo a phrase used by the Chamber in another context, "it is a far cry from this hypothesis to geographical
reality." 5 0
Rectangles, triangles, squares, or circles almost never occur in nature; they are geometrical shapes - with mathematically predictable
properties and relationships. Nature, to the contrary, presents an untidy
assemblage of irregular configurations all in a continual state of flux. It is
the challenging task of geographers, equipped with a number of sub-fields
of expertise, to find and analyze the real-world relationships that do exist
in particular regional settings across the globe. Experience has shown
that such relationships are complex and, especially when humans are involved, seldom predictable.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gros was vigorous in criticizing the
Chamber's subjective description of the Gulf of Maine as forming a rectangle. He wrote:
The idea that the Gulf [of Maine] is a rectangle has no other utility
than to prepare the discovery that an angle in the north of the Gulf
will enable a bisector to be drawn; the choice of some imaginary lines
to compose certain sides of the mythical rectangle ending in an area
outside the Chamber's competence is presented as a striking likeness of
nature. The Gulf is not a rectangle in any exact description of the facts
in this case, since, like any gulf, it has only three sides, but it is made
out to be one simply because that enables it to be given a fourth side at
its entrance which will prove an indispensable line for justifying the
tionality. However, his construct of the delimitation line, accompanying his separate opinion,
allowed Canada less of the area of Georges Bank.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 268.
49 Id. (emphasis added).
50 Id. at 334.
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direction of the final segment of the boundary ....
In Judge Gros's view, a judge should not "modify the geographical situa-

tion by a representation, be it a line, rectangle
or angle, which is his own
' 52
vision of the facts and alters those facts.
IX.

THE

EQUITABLENESS OF THE CHAMBER'S LINE

It was not until page 99 of its 105-page decision document that the
Chamber formally took up its last remaining task, which was "to ascertain whether the result thus arrived at may be considered as intrinsically
equitable, in the light of all the circumstances which may be taken into
account for the purpose of that decision." 5 3 Such verification was not
deemed necessary in the instance of the two segments (A-B, B-C) of the
delimitation line drawn inside the Gulf of Maine. Within the gulf, the
Chamber averred, "it would scarcely be possible to assess the equitable
character of the delimitation. . . on the basis of any other than the dominant parameters provided by the physical and political geography of the
54

area."

Outside the Gulf of Maine and over Georges Bank, the Chamber felt
that the question of intrinsic equitableness might take on something of a
different complexion. As the Chamber saw the matter:
This Bank is the real subject of the dispute between the United States
and Canada in the present case, the principal stake in the proceedings,
from the viewpoint of the potential resources of the subsoil and also, in
particular, that of fisheries that are of major economic importance.
Some enquiry whether, in addition to the factors provided by the geography of the Gulf itself, there are no others that should be taken into
account, is therefore an understandable step. It might well appear that
other circumstances ought properly to be taken into consideration in
assessing the equitable character of the result produced by this portion
of the delimitation line, which is destined to divide the riches of the
waters and shelf of this Bank between the two neighbouring
countries. 55
The Chamber's "other circumstances" worthy of consideration were
found to be summed up in the data from human and economic geography provided by the parties. In the Chamber's opinion, these data were
"ineligible for consideration as criteria to be applied in the delimitation
51 Id. at 379-80.
52 Id. at 380.
53 Id. at 339-40.
54 Id. at 340. In support of the correctness of this position the Chamber noted that neither
party had made any special reference to the fishing or potential petroleum resources existing landward of the Gulf of Maine closing line.
5 Id.
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process itself . ... ,,56 Economic and human geography might, however, "be relevant to assessment of the equitable character of a delimitation first established on the basis of criteria borrowed from physical and
political geography." 5 7 Once again the Chamber exhibited its admitted
"land dominates sea" bias. The declaration is that a line of delimitation
the Chamber set in motion by means of its arguably subjective interpretation of the complexities of coastal configurations in the far corners of the
Gulf of Maine would govern the division of the world's premier fishing
ground with only the slightest heed being paid to the rich history of humankind's activities there over the centuries since discovery. While no
disrespect is intended, it could be said that the Chamber was creating a
situation in which a remote Gulf of Maine "tail" was wagging a Georges
Bank "dog."
X.

THE CONCEPT OF THE BEHAVIORAL ENVIRONMENT

The Chamber might have avoided the pitfall of allowing a Gulf of
Maine "tail" to wag the Georges Bank "dog" by broadening its narrow
definition of geography to embrace the discipline's well-established subfield, historical geography."8 Historical geographers, committed to an investigation of the disputed area through its long history of human use,
would agree that Georges Bank itself, rather than the fringing coasts of
the gulf, was the disputed region's fulcrum.
In his seminal paper, Historical Geography and the Concept of the
Behavioral Environment, British geographer William Kirk emphasized
that:
In as much as in Historical Geography we are concerned with the behavior of human groups in relation to environment it behooves us to
reconstruct the environment not only as it was at various dates but as
it was observed and thought to be, for it is in this behavioral environment that physical features acquire values and potentialities which attract or repel human action.5 9
Kirk's behavioral environment concept is similar to that of the
"psychomilieu" as it was discussed in the context of international political decision-making by the well-recognized work of Harold and Margaret Sprout. In the Sprouts' thesis, "what matters in decision-making
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 As the term suggests, the chief concerns of historical geography deal with the geography of

areas in times past and the changing geographical relationships of areas through time. See also, De
Vorsey, Florida'sSeaward Boundary: A Problem in Applied HistoricalGeography, 25 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 214-20 (Aug. 1973).
59 Kirk, Historical Geography and the Concept of the Behavioral Environment, INDIAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOC'Y SILVER JUBILEE SOUVENIR & N. SUBRAHMANYAM MEMORIAL VOLUME 159
(Madras, 1952).
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• . . is how the milieu appears to the decision maker(s) under consideration - not how the milieu actually is or how it appears, or might appear,
60
to some other person(s).",
XI.

THE GEORGES BANK ENVIRONMENT AS CONSIDERED
BY THE CHAMBER

It is significant to note that neither of the parties invoked a consideration of the historical behavioral environment of Georges Bank in its
arguments before the Chamber. In the case of Canada, this is understandable, in view of what will be discussed below. It is far less understandable on the part of the United States' litigators, who might have
strengthened their position through such a reconstruction. This is not to
imply that the United States failed to mount historical arguments. The
traditional arguments failed, however, to sway the Chamber, which summarized them in the following paragraph:
233. In the eyes of the United States, the main consideration here is the
historical presence of man in the disputed areas. It believes the decisive factor here to be the activities pursued by the United States and its
nationals since the country's independence and even before, activities
which they claim to have been alone in pursuing over the greater part
of that long period. This reasoning is simple and somewhat akin to the
invocation of historic rights, though that expression has not been used.
This continuous human presence took the form especially of fishing,
and of the conservation and management of fisheries, but it also included other maritime activities concerning navigational assistance,
rescue, research, defense, etc. All these activities, said greatly to exceed in duration and scale the more recent and limited activities of
Canada and its nationals, must, according to the United States, be regarded as a major relevant circumstance for the purpose of reaching an
equitable solution to the delimitation problem. 61
As mentioned above, Canada placed far less stress on historical arguments concerning its nationals' activities on Georges Bank through
time. As the Chamber summarized, "the only period which in Canada's
eyes should be regarded as relevant was the recent one leading up to, or
even continuing beyond, the time when both States finally decided to go
ahead with the institution of exclusive fishery zones." 62 In Canada's
view only the events of the current decade were worthy of weight in the
Chamber's adjudication of the lateral boundary dispute.
The Chamber rejected these positions of the parties. In the case of
the United States, the Chamber confirmed "its decision not to ascribe
60
61
62

H. SPROUT & M. SPROUT, TOWARD
Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 340-41.
Id. at 341.

A POLITICS OF THE PLANET EARTH

192 (1971).

1986]

GULF OF MAINE DISPUTE

any decisive weight. . . to the antiquity or continuity of fishing activities
carried on in the past within that part of the delimitation area which lies
outside the closing line of the Gulf."' 63 In the Chamber's view, the waters
over Georges Bank "were part of the high seas and as such freely open to
the fishermen not only of the United States and Canada but also of other
countries ..

. ."

More discussion of the United States' thesis regard-

ing Georges Bank is included in the Chamber's decision but these quotations suffice to make clear that the judges persisted in a view of these
disputed waters as what Judge Gros critically characterized as "an empty
sea" - just so much more undifferentiated blue high seas as shown on
small-scale maps and charts.
Most of the 300 supporting maps, sketches or diagrams that Canada
and the United States included with the 7,600 pages of pleadings and
2,000 pages of oral arguments submitted to the Chamber showed the bathymetry and features of Georges Bank. The presence of these shallows
is the dominant submarine feature immediately seaward of the Gulf of
Maine closing line (Figures 1 and 2). In anthropomorphic terms it might
be described as a broad submerged "thumb" stretching from a "hand" or
"palm" formed by the northeastern states. The space between the
imagined thumb and an index finger, forming the New England coast
from Massachusetts to New Brunswick, is occupied by the Gulf of
Maine. Immediately to the north of the tip of the Georges Bank
"thumb" lies a marked depression shown on the charts as the Northwestern Channel.
After its consideration of the best and most current expert scientific
evidence dealing with the offshore environment, that the parties could
supply, the Chamber concluded that:
The continental shelf of the whole of this area is no more than an
undifferentiated part of the continental shelf of the eastern seaboard of
North America, from Newfoundland to Florida. According to generally accepted scientific findings, this shelf is a single continuous, uniform and uninterrupted physiographical structure, even if here and
there it features some secondary characteristics resulting mainly from
glacial and fluvial action. In this wider context the continental shelf of
the area relevant to the present proceedings may be defined as the natural prolongation of the land mass around the Gulf of Maine; neither
Party disputes the fact that there is nothing in this single sea-bed, lacking any marked elevations or depressions, to distinguish one part that
might be considered as constituting the natural prolongation of the
coasts of the United States from another part which could be regarded
as the natural prolongation of the coasts of Canada.6 5
63 Id.
64 Id.

65 Id. at 273-74.
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Even the disputed area's most accentuated feature, the Northeast Channel, was found to lack the "characteristics of a real trough marking the
dividing-line between two geomorphologically distinct units."6 6
When it came to the water over and around Georges Bank, the
Chamber concluded "that it too essentially possesses the same character
of unity and uniformity already apparent from an examination of the seabed, so that, in respect of the waters too, one must take note of the impossibility of discerning any natural boundary capable of serving as a
basis for carrying out a delimitation of the kind requested of the Chamber."" Neither party, needless to say, had argued the existence of a simple "natural boundary" in the waters of the disputed area seaward of the
Gulf of Maine. They had, however, emphasized the distinctive and palpable qualities of those waters at great length. Canada, for example, acknowledged the fact that "there is a distinct ecosystem of Georges Bank,
which is geographically defined by the Great South Channel and the
68
Northeast Channel.

It is clear from these quotations, and other statements by the Chamber, that it was not swayed from its "empty sea" stance by the parties'
impressive efforts to employ the findings of modern ocean science concerning the physical environment of the area in dispute.69 Modern science can inventory and evaluate the natural phenomena, living and
inanimate, as well as the physical and human processes operating in any
particular area of earth space with some degree of reliability. Oceanographic scientists do not, however, normally concern themselves with the
reconstruction of past "behavioral environments" - those cognition fields
or milieus within which individuals and groups framed their choices, decisions and activities over time in a region. It is suggested that this is
precisely the sort of reconstruction with which the Chamber should be
primarily concerned if the application of international law is to result in
truly equitable solutions rather than apparently arbitrary pronouncements concerning the human disputes and problems which result from
those past choices, decisions, and actions in their regional contexts.

XII.

THE BEHAVIORAL ENVIRONMENT OF GEORGES BANK

The full reconstruction of the behavioral environment of Georges
Bank and its superjacent waters would run to an extended length and
produce a monograph of ample proportions. Space limitations will not
66 Id. at 274.
67 Id. at 277. The only known instance of a natural oceanic water boundary serving as a polit-

ical boundary was in Florida following the state's re-entry into the United States in 1868. For a
discussion of this unique boundary, see generally De Vorsey, supra note 58, at 214-20.
68 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 276.
69 Id. at 277.
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permit the examination of more than a few selected elements that could
form integral parts of the reconstructed behavioral environment of the
disputed area.
In the eyes of the many generations of fishermen who inhabited the
shores of the Gulf of Maine and began the commercial exploitation of its
fishery at least as early as 1710, Georges Bank was an extension of New
England. This view was eloquently stated by the New England philosopher-author, Henry David Thoreau in the middle of the last century. In
his book, Cape Cod, Thoreau reported that "[o]n Cape Cod the next
most eastern land you hear of is St. George's Bank."7 Thoreau went on
to state:
the fishermen tell of "Georges," "Cashus," and other sunken lands
they frequent. Every Cape man has a theory about George's Bank
having been an island once, and in their accounts they gradually reduce the shallowness from six, five, four, two fathoms, to somebody's
confident assertion7 1that he has seen a mackeral-gull sitting on a piece
of dry land there.
The persistence of this folk view of Georges Bank as a former island
outlier of New England was demonstrated by Shebnah Rich in an account published in 1883:
The distance from Chatham to southwest Georges is about sixty miles.
One sixth nearly of this distance is here accounted for [by islands that
had been eroded by the sea since Gosnold and Smith's exploration in
the early 1600s] which well sustains the opinion, that at no very distant
day Georges Bank was connected with groups of islands, if not mainland, extending to Nantucket and the Cape. Old Skipper Joseph
Wharf, the father of the late Joseph, used to say that he had played ball
on Georges, and men were living fifty years ago, who said they had
seen long strings of gulls sitting on the dry sandbars.
It used to be quoted as history, that an Amsterdam72 Company
once proposed purchasing the right to build there a port.
Henry Mitchell, a scientist with the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, added qualified support to folk cognitions of Georges Bank as a
wasted remnant of former land. In an official report dated October 10,
1878, Mitchell noted that "St. George's Bank, the summit of which is
called George's Shoal, is probably a wasted island."7 3 In support of this
70 2 H.D. THOREAU, CAPE COD 123 (1896). In his own book, Cape Cod and the Old Colony,
Albert Perry Brigham reflected on the folk-view reported by Thoreau. After recounting an oft-told
tale of a ship's crew once playing a game of baseball on an exposed shoal on Georges Bank, Brigham
concluded, "True or false, the yam serves to fix in the memory this feature of our Atlantic waters."
A.B. BRIGHAM, CAPE COD AND THE OLD COLONY 55 (1920) (emphasis added).
71 2 H.D. THOREAU, supra note 70, at 123.
72 S. RICH, TRURO-CAPE COD 195 (1883).
73 H. MITCHELL, PHYSICAL HYDROGRAPHY OF THE GULF OF MAINE, REPORT OF THE SU-
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conclusion Mitchell wrote:
Capt. Isaac Hull, U.S.N., made note, in 1815(?), of the assertion of
Cape Cod fishermen that 'part of the shoal has been quite dry, with
gulls sitting upon it,' and states that his own shoalest water was three
feet after subtracting over seven feet for height of tide. There would
seem to be no reason why the sands should not heap up occasionally so
as to emerge at low tide; but the testimony is not direct, and I find
much the same report mentioned with discredit in Hollingsworth's
Nova Scotia, printed in 1786. 74
It is informative to contrast these reported folk views of Georges
Bank as a wasted island with the analysis of Thomas Pownall, who
served as governor of colonial Massachusetts during the period of 17571759. In his frequently cited treatise, TopographicalDescription of the
Dominions of the United States of America, Pownall described "a long
Hook of a Promontory called Cape Cod."'75 Pownall continued:
The Long Low neck of land by which this [the Promontory itself is
high Land] is joined to the Main seems to have been formed by the
Coil and Recoil of the Tides, rolling up Silt and Sand at the Thread of
their least Force . . . . Many and various Alternations have been
made, and are continually making on the East Coast at the Back of this
Promontory: And a long Point of Sand has been formed into solid
Marsh Land within these Forty Years, at the South Point of it. Let
those who are curious in the Process of the Operation of Nature, watch
the Progress of George's Sand. From the Inquiries I made, and the
Answers I got, I think that it will in some Years, and perhaps not
many hence, form into another Sable Island. Its southern Point is now
at Low Water with a strong off-shore Wind visibly a Shoal.76
For maximum appreciation, Pownall's description of Georges Bank
in process of evolving into another Sable Island should be read with a
copy of A General Map of the Northern British Colonies in America 1776
at hand. 77 On this important Revolutionary-era map, a large shaded area
PERINTENDENT OF THE U.S. COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY SHOWING THE PROGRESS OF THE

WORK DURING THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING WITH JUNE, 1879, EXEC. Doc. No. 17, 46th Cong., 2d

Sess. 176, app. 10 (1881).
74 Mitchell's statement that the report of dry banks on Georges Bank was mentioned with
"discredit" by Hollingsworth is hard to understand and may have resulted from an incorrect reading
of his notes. With reference to Georges Bank, Hollingsworth wrote, "it is asserted to have been seen
dry in some places, which is not impossible, as there are credible persons who have sounded upon it
in three fathoms water." S. HOLLINGSWORTH, AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRESENT STATE OF NOVA

SCOTIA 29 (Edinburgh 1786).
75 T. POWNALL, TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE DOMINION OF THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA 89 (1949).
76 Id. at 89-90.
77 R. SAYER & J. BENNETT, A GENERAL MAP OF THE NORTHERN BRITISH COLONIES IN

AMERICA

. . . (published

by the Admiralty & Bd. of Trade, London 1776).
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off the New England coast is identified as "St. George's Bank or Malabar." Several small detached shaded areas fringe the main bank on its
southern and southeastern edge. A gloss on the map explains these areas
as "South Points of Malabar to be dry at low water with an offshore wind
vid. Governor Pownall's Topographical Description." Thus, Pownall's
hypothesis concerning Georges Bank, based on "Inquiries I made, and
the Answers I got," was brought to the attention of a wider map-using
public as well as the readers of his book.
Pownall was not alone in his interest in the formation and dynamics
of the fishing banks found on the continental shelves of New England
and eastern Canada. Thomas Jefferson, while considering a proposal to
construct a canal through the Isthmus of Panama in a letter written in
1786, commented on possible impacts on the fishing banks far to the
north. He speculated that the Gulf Stream would be deflected by such a
canal and "Those banks, ceasing to receive supplies of sand, weeds and
warm water by the gulf stream, it might become problematical what 'ef'7
fect changes of pasture and temperature would have on the fisheries. 1
Even more interesting than his speculation regarding the influence
of the Gulf Stream in forming and nourishing the fishing banks were
Jefferson's thoughts concerning the ocean current as a potential "natural
boundary" for the United States. John Quincy Adams revealed Jefferson's ideas on this score in the following extract dated November 30,
1805:
The President mentioned a late act of hostility committed by a French
privateer near Charleston, South Carolina, and said that we ought to
assume as a principle that the neutrality of our territory should extend
to the Gulf Stream, which was a natural boundary, and within which
we ought not to suffer any hostility to be committed ....
I observed
that it might be well, before we ventured to assume a claim so broad, to
wait for a time when we should have a force competent to maintain it.
But in the mean time, he said, it was advisable to squint at it, and to
accustom the nations of Europe to the idea that we should claim it in
future.79
While the United States never made an official attempt to establish
its outer limits at the Gulf Stream, there is evidence that much "squinting" to seaward did take place in the period following Jefferson's statement. For example, in 1807, An Act to Provide for Surveying the Coasts
of the United States declared it to be lawful for the President "[t]o cause
such examinations and observations to be made, with respect to St.
Georges Bank, and any other bank or shoal . . . to the Gulf Stream
78 10 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 530 (J.P. Boyd ed. 1954).
79 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINcY ADAMS 375 (C.F. Adams ed. 1874).
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. . . .,'0 The specific inclusion of St. Georges Bank in this general statute is an indication of just how highly regarded this portion of continental shelf was at this early date. From the fishing villages around the Gulf
of Maine to the corridors of power in the new capital city of Washington,
Georges Bank conjured up images of both potential riches and great hazard for the hardy shipowners and fishermen who dared venture there.
The unpredictable weather, wave conditions, and swift tidal currents
that swept the shallow seas over Georges Bank were responsible for an
enormous loss of human life and property. The port of Gloucester, Massachusetts, alone counted the loss of 87 ships and 722 men on Georges
Bank in the period from 1837 to 1873.81 Not surprisingly, this factor
loomed large in the emergence of Georges Bank as a major element of
the behavioral environments of the groups inhabiting the shores of the
Gulf of Maine. In the words of an early chairman of the Portland Harbor Commission: "The bones of all who have perished there would make
a monument higher than that on Bunker Hill; and the property lost
would pay for one of silver, if not too high."82
The surviving brother of one victim of Georges Bank was moved
sufficiently to develop a truly amazing scheme to convert the shoalest
portion of the bank to a man-made island to serve as the base for a lighthouse. In 1838, Seward Porter, a well known Portland shipowner, petitioned Congress "for the erection of a beacon on St. George's shoal, or
the cession of said shoal to him and his associates."8 3 Porter proposed
that "old vessels loaded, with stone, to be sunk and imbedded there"
would form the nucleus of an island much like Sable Island to the
north.84 In his view "the Isle of Sables was once a hidden shoal, and
converted into an island by the accidental wreck of vessels thereon."85
Nothing came of Porter's proposal to gain a cession of Georges
Shoal from Congress, but the idea of creating an island there persisted.
Almost a half-century later, Henry Mitchell, Assistant of the U.S. Coast
and Geodetic Survey, presented "an urgent plea for the establishment of
a light on Saint George's Bank" in Appendix No. 11 to the Superintendent's annual report for 1885. Mitchell, like Porter, drew attention to
80 LAWS OF THE U.S. IN RELATION TO THE NAVY AND MARINE CORPS. 78 (B. Homans
comp., Washington 1841).
81 G.H. PROCTOR, THE FISHERMEN'S MEMORIAL AND RECORD BOOK 6-53 (1873).
82 H. MITCHELL, A PLEA FOR THE LIGHT ON ST. GEORGE'S BANK, REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE U.S. COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY,

app. no. 11, at 485 (Washington 1886).

83 S. PORTER, MEMORIAL FOR THE ERECTION OF A BEACON ON ST. GEORGE'S SHOAL, OR

THE CESSION OF SAID SHOAL TO HIM AND HIS ASSOCIATES, S. DoC. No. 115, 25th Cong., 2d Sess.

1 (1838) (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 1-2.
85 Id. at 2.
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the similarity that existed between Georges Shoal and Sable Island in the
following statement from his plea:
Saint George's Bank lies at the threshold of the Gulf of Maine,
and its summit is called distinctively "George's Shoal" or "The
Georges." Twenty miles westward of the Georges is the "Cultivator
Shoal." Upon the Georges there are two spots of 12 feet given by
chart, while upon Cultivator Shoal there is not less than 18 feet.
It is 100 miles from the nearest land, Chatham, Cape Cod. Its
situation relative to the continent is like that of Sable Island, and, like
this island, it would long ago have been lighted if dry land. As a shoal
it is far more dangerous than it would be as an island, and therefore it
is shunned and feared except by fishermen who are obliged to brave its
dangers.8 6
In both implicit and explicit terms, Porter's scheme and Mitchell's
later plea for a lighthouse on Georges make clear the fact that the bank
was widely recognized as being a part of the United States. Clearly the
early observations of the common fishermen, who saw Georges Bank as
"the next most eastern land" from their New England shores, were being
confirmed in these ambitious proposals to convert the shoal to an island
for a light house. Such cognitions, when taken in the aggregate, outline
the historical behavioral environment of Georges Bank and form the basis for special circumstances that were eminently worthy of consideration
by the International Court of Justice in its attempt to structure an equitable line of delimitation.
Thus far in this discussion the significance of Georges Bank in the
behavioral environment of New Englanders and national leaders of the
United States has been stressed. It is necessary, in view of the dispute
and decision under consideration, to direct some attention to Canadian
historical cognitions with respect to Georges Bank. When Canada's
stress on the recent period is recalled it should come as no surprise that
even the most diligent search of the historical record failed to produce a
significant body of Canadian cognitions that could be used to argue that
Georges Bank was historically a true Canadian behavioral environment.
What that search did reveal was substance for an argument against any
such claim had Canada attempted to mount one.
One extremely convincing body of evidence that would negate an
attempt to place Georges Bank in a position of prominence in any reconstructed Canadian behavioral environment is found in the records of the
Halifax Fisheries Commission, an international tribunal that convened
for several months during 1877.87 The commission was charged with
86 H. MITCHELL, supra note 82, at 483.
87 AWARD OF THE FISHERY COMMISSION: DOCUMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HALT-
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determining what, if any, compensation the United States should pay
Canada in return for the "exchange" of inshore fishing rights under the
provisions of the 1870 Treaty of Washington. To support their claims,
the Canadians collected depositions from several hundred fishermen.
Each of the 319 deponents described the areas in which he had fished in
his career at sea. Several of them mentioned seasons during which they
worked aboard American vessels, with some mentioning time spent on
Georges Bank or in the "George's Fleet." In all of this voluminous testimony, however, only one Canadian vessel is described as ever having
fished on Georges Bank. Julien Boudreau, of Esquimaux Point, Quebec,
testified:
I have lived here 16 years, before that I lived at the Magdalene Islands
where I was born. I am 63 years of age and have been a fisherman for
50 years, and for the last 45 years I have been carrying on the fishery
with a vessel of which I was master and owner, on the north coast of
the Gulf of St. Lawrence, from Sheldrake to the Straits of Belleisle,
and in the Straits of Belleisle and on the Atlantic Coast of Labrador, as
far as Cape Harrison, at the Magdalene Islands, on La Have Bank, at
the mouth of the Bay of Fundy, and on Georges Bank. I am well acquainted with every operation relating
88 to the taking and curing of codfish, halibut, mackerel and herring.
The best that can be concluded is that, at some time between 1843 and
1878, Julien Boudreau, a Quebec fisherman and master, fished on
Georges Bank. This single instance out of 319 investigations does little
to place Georges Bank high in a Canadian behavioral environment or
domain of any sort.
The absence of Canadian fishing vessels on Georges Bank in this
nineteenth-century period is also verified by a survey of the annual lists
of shipwrecks published by the Canadian Department of Marine and
Fisheries. These lists normally include the location at which vessels were
wrecked or lost. A screening of the lists for 1869, 1870, 1871, and 1872
indicates no wrecks or losses in the area of Georges Bank.89
Similar negative evidence for the period 1884-1890 can be gleaned
from a history of Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, one of the Canadian fishing
centers closest to Georges Bank. This work includes a comprehensive
list of Yarmouth County maritime casualties during this period." What
emerges from a study of these data is the fact that most of the Yarmouth
FAX COMMISSION, 1877, UNDER THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON OF MAY 8, 1871, H.R. EXEc. Doc.

No. 89, 45th Cong., 2d Sess.
88 Id. at Vol. 2, 1361, app. G (emphasis added).
89 See 1870 Ann. Rep., Can. Dept. of Marine & Fisheries; 1871 Ann. Rep., Can. Dept. of
Marine & Fisheries; 1872 Ann. Rep., Can. Dept. of Marine & Fisheries; 1873 Ann. Rep., Can. Dept.
of Marine & Fisheries.
90 J.M. LAWSON, YARMOUTH PAST AND PRESENT: A BOOK OF REMINISCENSES (1902).
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ships lost were engaged in merchant shipping rather than fishing. The
fishing vessels that were lost met their fates on the Grand Banks, Western Bank, or Grand Manan. No Yarmouth vessels were lost on Georges
Bank although several Yarmouth fishermen lost their lives there while
serving on New England schooners out of Gloucester and Rockland. In
view of facts like these, it is not surprising that Canada had argued to
convince the Chamber that only activities taking place on Georges Bank
in recent decades should be regarded as relevant in the quest for an equitable line of delimitation there.
XIII.

CONCLUSION

In its effort to establish a single equitable line of delimitation
through the disputed waters off New England and Nova Scotia, the International Court of Justice Chamber paid close attention to the physical
and political geography of the coasts fronting on the Gulf of Maine. In
so doing the Chamber disregarded the long history of human activities
associated with Georges Bank. This was done in spite of the fact that the
Chamber itself stated that "[t]his Bank is the real subject of the dispute
"91
. . . the principal stake in the proceedings ...
Of the two contesting parties, it was clearly the United States that
possessed the strongest historical evidence of its nationals' activities on
Georges Bank since the time before and following independence. Those
activities were continuous and took the form especially of fishing, the
conservation and management of fisheries, and such other maritime activities as charting, research, navigational assistance, search and rescue,
and defense. Obviously, however, the presentation of this historical evidence was less than persuasive, it being found by the Chamber "simple
and somewhat akin to the invocation of historic rights." a
Recent experience in an original jurisdiction action before the
United States Supreme Court suggests that the United States might have
had more success in persuading the Chamber had it followed the strategy
of presenting its historical evidence in the conceptual framework of the
Georges Bank behavioral environment. The original jurisdiction case referred to is United States of America v. Maine93 (Massachusetts Boundary Case). The issue to be decided in that original jurisdiction
proceeding was whether Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound were
bays under the terms of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
In presenting its claim, Massachusetts included the argument that
the state possessed title to the sounds as a result of the historical usage of
91 Delimitation, 1984 I.C.J. at 340.

92 Id. at 340-41.
93 United States v. Maine, No. 35, report of the Special Master (S. Ct. Oct. 1984).
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them by its citizens from colonial times to the present. By invoking the
strategy provided by Kirk's behavioral environment concept in this context, Massachusetts' expert historical geographer witness succeeded in
convincing the Special Master to the extent that he concluded and reported to the Supreme Court "that Massachusetts has introduced sufficient evidence to support a finding that the nature and extent of the
colonists' exploitation of the marine resources of the sounds
was
94
equivalent to a formal assumption of sovereignty over them."
In the discussion included in that report, the Special Master, Judge
Walter E. Hoffman, further noted that the Supreme Court had not previously had the opportunity to decide the extent to which historical evidence of the sort marshalled by Massachusetts could support a historic
inland waters claim. He informed the Court that this issue had, however, arisen in international tribunals and that those tribunals had tended
to consider favorably the kind of evidence presented by Massachusetts.
Exactly what weight the World Court Chamber might have ascribed
to arguments based on a behavioral environment strategy is impossible to
estimate. It is argued here, however, that such a strategy vigorously invoked by the United States would have succeeded in focusing the Chamber's attention more squarely on Georges Bank and the continental shelf
riches it epitomizes. Such focus on the declared bone of contention in the
parties' dispute would, in turn, make clear the fact that land had not
"dominated" sea here in the traditional sense of the Chamber's quoted
adage. Rather, the coastal fringe from Cape Cod to southern Nova Scotia had, more often than not, been evaluated and developed in response
to the perceived riches of the waters and beds of the adjacent continental
shelves - particularly Georges Bank. A line of determination in the
vicinity of the bank should have been drawn in the light of perspectives
and arguments that emphasized the facts of past human assessments and
behavior there rather than a subjective interpretation of the coastline in a
far corner of the Gulf of Maine.

94

Id. at 58.
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